Reynolds (as did Kaiser) eventually benefited from this arrangement. It was able to lease or purchase the Hurricane Creek, Arkansas, alumina plant, the Listerhill, Alabama, sheet mill, and the Troutdale, Oregon, smelter. Reynolds also got the right to purchase bauxite from the U.S Government's stockpile for the Hurricane Creek, Arkansas, alumina plant, and the right to the use of Alcoa's patents royalty-free at the plant. In addition, both Kaiser and itself benefited from rental terms varying from 4 per cent to 8 per cent of the fair value of the plant's capacity used over a five-year lease period and the granting of lease renewal and purchase options.

Advances

Despite these advances by Reynolds, an important link was missing: access to bauxite reserves. Alcoa and Alcan (which at the time were closely related), had 'shared' the bauxite reserves in the Guianas - the then known main source of economic reserves in the Western Hemisphere - Alcoa, in Dutch Guiana (later Suriname) and Alcan, in British Guiana (later Guyana).

Reynolds clearly recognised the strategic importance of access of bauxite reserves and accordingly, from as early as November 1942, through its vice-president, Walter Rice, wrote the US Secretary of State Cordell Hull, seeking the State Department's support by linking the access by the company to Jamaican bauxite (which was positively identified by 1942, and over which Alcan especially, and Billiton of the Netherlands, had begun preliminary investigations) to the United States' strategic interests. Rice wrote, in part:

'The combination of these huge deposits (Jamaica's) with low-cost power and the billion pound aluminium plant in Saguenay River in Canada would enable the British Empire to dominate the international aluminium markets for perhaps a hundred years, and would stifle the development of a large competitive aluminium industry in the United States... The problem is much larger than our company. Since we know of no ore discovery in recent years, of comparable strategic importance, we believe the freedom to mine and ship bauxite from Jamaica to the United States is vitally important to the industrial future of our country and our national security, and the issue cannot await the termination of the war.'

This letter was followed by one to the U.S. Bureau of Mines, in January 1943, seeking information on the bauxite in Jamaica. The Bureau responded by giving it some information of where it believed some deposits were located, the size of the ore bodies, and the chemical characteristics.

In the very same month, Reynolds wrote yet another letter, this time to John Huggins (later Sir John, Governor of Jamaica from 1943 to 1950), who was then with the Anglo-American Commission in Washington, formally requesting the co-operation of the Jamaican Government in exploring, acquiring and mining ore.

This was followed by a visit to Jamaica, in February 1943, by Mr. Rice and the chief geologist O.C. Schmedeman. They met with the Governor, Sir Arthur Richards during this visit, and requested equal treatment with Alcan and Billiton.

Among other things, the Reynolds team stressed the significance of exploiting the ore for the war effort:

Urgent

Since it is urgent to produce high-grade bauxite in order to obtain maximum output of aluminium required for military aircraft, we would like to have permission to proceed at the earliest date.

Sir Arthur wrote the British Secretary of State for the Colonies in March 1943 passing on Reynolds' requests, and supported the company on the grounds that it was undesirable to give Alcan a concession over the whole island. (It was clear that there was never any intention to allow Billiton to become seriously involved in the Jamaican industry, and, as it turned out, the company soon left Jamaica for good). Support was also given by U.S consular and other representatives.

In the event, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, wired the Governor to say that the matter was referred to the Aluminium Committee of the Combined Raw Materials Board (this Board was set up after Japan's attack on Pearl Harbour on December 7, 1941, by the U.S. and U.K. Govern-ments to co-ordinate their policies in purchasing and allocating raw materials). The Board, comprised Sir Richard Fairy of the British Aluminium Company, Mr. G.C. Bateman, the Canadian Metals Controller, and Mr. C.E. Wilson, of the US War Production Board.

Apparently, the Board gave Reynolds the 'thumbs down'. This decision was regarded as likely by Jamaican officials, because British Aluminium was closely allied with Alcan, and the Canadian Metals Controller would be hard put to go against his country's aluminium flagship, Alcan.

Reynolds learned from U.S. Government officials in May 1943, that tests of bauxite shipped by Alcan to Alcoa's East St. Louis, Illinois, alumina plant, could not be processed by the technology that had been used to process bauxite from the United States and the Guianas. It also learned from the State Department that the Aluminium Committee of the Combined Raw Materials Board had rescinded its earlier decision in regard to their application to explore and mine bauxite in Jamaica.

The inability to process the ore, and, in the event, the 'turning of the tide' in favour of the Allies resulted in Jamaican bauxite not being required for the war effort. So, by late 1944, all hurdles to Reynolds' participation in the Jamaican industry had been removed. Clearance was given to begin exploration, and, in November of that year, the Company secured options on 15,000 acres of land. It later purchased lands (ultimately some 60,000 acres) and undertook research on the economic processing of Jamaican ore.

It moved to commercial operations on the bases of: (a) its ability to develop an appropriate processing technology; (b) the receipt of "Marshall Plan" Funds (as did Alcan) from the United States Economic Co-operation Administration; (c) attractive taxation regimes, both in the United States and Jamaica; (d) the stockpiling of bauxite by the U.S. Government; (e) increase in the demand for aluminium for peace time uses as well as a result of the War in Korea.

The round of expansion to meet the Korean War effort as well as the stockpile of the metal by the U.S. Government were particularly significant in creating the need for more bauxite, alumina, and alumina capacity. One outcome of this need was the construction of the Corpus Christi, Texas alumina plant, by Reynolds to process Jamaican bauxite.

The company established its mining facility at Lydford, St. Ann, and a port at Ocho Rios. It had the distinction of being the first exporter of commercial quantities of bauxite from Jamaica. This happened on June 5, 1952.

Major player

It became a major player in Jamaica's economic life in three distinct respects:

From its early full dependence on Jamaican ore, Reynolds later became a more diversified company with facilities in various parts of the world, including nearby Guyana where it mined and shipped bauxite.

When Alcoa made its take-over bid last year, Reynolds had: (a) nearly 3 million tonnes of alumina capacity (7.5 per cent of the world's total); (b) 1.1 million tonnes of primary aluminium capacity (6 per cent of the world total); (c) 250,000 tonnes of falt-rolled product capacity (1.5 per cent of the world total; and (d) interests in extrusions, packaging, castings and secondary smelting.

Its bauxite and alumina interests included:

Although Reynolds terminated its operations in Jamaica, it was still being supplied with Jamaican bauxite from the Kaiser Jamaica Bauxite Mining operations in St. Ann. Indeed, consequent on the closure of the Gramercy plant, present operations at that mine are largely for the Reynolds, Corpus Christi, plant. The arrangement calls for the supply of some 5.4 million tonnes from 1999 through 2001.

A condition of the merger with, or takeover of Reynolds, is that Alcoa must dispose of all of the former's alumina assets, viz: 100 per cent of the Corpus Christi, Texas, alumina plant; 5 per cent of the Stade, Germany, alumina plant; and 56 per cent of the Worsley (one of the world's best), Australia, alumina plant. Alcoa must also divest 25 per cent of the Longview, Washington smelter.

The demise of Reynolds and the concomitant enhancement of Aloca pose some interesting opportunities and challenges for Jamaica. The opportunities lie in the prospect of Jamaica playing a larger role in Alcoa's world raw materials system. Currently (in alumina terms) the country only supplies some 4 per cent of that company's needs.

The challenge is whether our supply of bauxite to the Corpus Christi alumina plant will be required by the new owner when the contract to supply expires at the end of 2001.

The demise of a once-great company like Reynolds is part and parcel of the enormous transformations which are taking place in the world economy, in the great process of "globalisation".

It is incumbent on us to understand these changes; to recognise that we are by no means immune from them; and to do all we can to be fit enough to survive with some comfort.