John RapleyWHILE THE stand-off in Kashmir shows no sign of let-up, diplomatic tensions between India and Pakistan do appear to have ebbed for now. India says it has heard the declaration of war on Muslim militants by Pakistan's President, General Pervez Musharraf. Now it wants to see action. Pakistan has been rounding up militants and closing their offices. However, India's demand, that Pakistan effectively end support for Kashmiris fighting for Independence from India, is unlikely to be met, given the popularity of the Kashmiri cause in Pakistan.
This struggle cuts to the heart of the identities of these two countries. Upon its foundation a half-century ago, India defined itself as a modern, secular state. Indians, the nationalist leadership maintained, were united by their nationality. Ethnic and religious differences were to diminish with the onset of modernity. And as the Indian state sank resources into building a modern, industrial economy, thereby creating employment for millions of migrants to the cities, national identity took root.
Pakistan's founders believed that the sub-continent's Muslim minority would never feel safe in a state dominated by Hindus. They thus called for a separate homeland for Muslims. Nevertheless, Pakistan's founders were themselves secularised, and wished also to create a state rooted in a national, rather than religious identity. However, the course of post-Independence development has proved rocky in Pakistan. Moreover, the hold of traditional elites on both politics and the economy proved tenuous. As the state's already-limited patronage powers receded under the weight of structural adjustment, poor Pakistanis began looking beyond the state for their security.
Stepping into this breach were the Islamists, whose resurgence began across the Muslim world in the 1970s. Raising money from the growing middle-class, itself a by-product of the modernising state, as well as from Pakistanis working in the Gulf oil states, these Islamist groups began providing schooling, employment, housing and security in places where the state had lost its ability to do so (rather as Jamaica's dons have done, raising money through the drug trade).
By the 1980s, hundreds of thousands of Pakistani children were being educated in madrassas (religious schools). As the Islamist tide swelled, the state tilted increasingly towards the Islamists. Over the next two decades, the Islamists would secure toe-holds in the military and intelligence services. They would go on to patronise the Taliban in Afghanistan, and Kashmiri militant groups.
As Pakistan veered towards Islam, so too did India begin retreating from its secular modernity. In the 1980s, partly in response to the growing threat posed by Islamic fundamentalism, a political movement developed which sought to redefine India's identity. Although Hindu nationalism has a long history in India, it never before approached the popularity it found in the newly created Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). Once again, as the Indian state retreated in the face of structural adjustment, networks connected to the BJP and its allies began picking up the slack. As they did so, they won an army of loyalists to their cause. By the end of the 1990s, the Hindu nationalists were in office in New Delhi.
At the same time, regional identities began to reassert themselves. As the federal state could no longer buy the loyalty of its people, they began looking to local patrons for support. It is in this context that the current struggle is being played out. India's founders insisted on overlooking the fact that most Kashmiris are Muslims, saying that they were first-and-foremost Indians and belonged in India. While today's ruling BJP might be more sympathetic to the idea that Muslims belong in Pakistan (since, they maintain, India belongs to Hindus), their followers also expect them to take a harder line against Muslims.
As for General Musharraf, he has decided to fall squarely on the modernist side of the fence. His crack-down on Muslim militants appears to be designed not just to placate India, but to roll back the influence of the Islamists within Pakistan. India will likely survive both a war and a peace. For General Musharraf, the risks are much greater. In war, his country would likely face defeat. But in peace, he risks stirring up so much Islamist ire that he could be overthrown. Indian and Western diplomats, anxious to secure a diplomatic solution, will do well to heed his precarious position.
John Rapley is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of Government, UWI, Mona.
