Balford Henry, Acting News Editor
The report of the Commission of Enquiry into the July 7-10 West Kingston security forces operations has now been made public, but the results have certainly not created the excitement which it promised.
In fact, issues like Ronnie Thwaites' financial problems and the recent killing of policemen have ignited twice as much interest as the commissioners' 400-odd page report.
Probably, the public had expected too much. Probably the supporters of the Government had wanted too much, especially in terms of condemning Opposition Leader Edward Seaga and his constituents.
But, what could have generated this expectation?
The fact that so many policemen testified, compared to a small number of civilians, virtually none of the victims and certainly none of the people from West Kingston who suffered the worst, plus the withdrawal of the Jamaica Labour Party from the proceedings, was good enough reason for the enquiry to have been abandoned, much less allowed to consume as much as $40 million of well needed public money for absolutely nothing.
Nothing more than what has been produced in this report could have been expected. If the commission had condemned Mr. Seaga, as some people wanted them to do, it would have been incredible without the evidence that was needed. It would also have been impossible for the commissioners to have condemned the security forces when the evidence they heard was almost totally from the security forces and their sympathisers and with no opposing lawyers to contradict them.
So the commissioners went ahead and did the only thing they could do, which was draw some conclusions from the one-sided evidence they had and make some recommendations at the end.
The enquiry was triggered by the July 7-10 incident in West Kingston which cost the lives of at least 27 persons, including a policeman and a soldier, and left nearly 60 people nursing various injuries.
The JLP felt that the incident was part of a strategy by the People's National Party (PNP) to tarnish the image of the leader, Edward Seaga, and Mr. Seaga's JLP constituency prior to the next general election.
The PNP, on the other hand, felt that it was an attempt by the constituents to arrogantly overcome the security forces and claim ascendancy in controlling the area.
The security forces felt that guns and ammunitions had arrived recently in the area and were being stashed away, as SSP Reneto Adams testified that his "intelligence" reported and that, "Jamaica would pay dearly for this," as he told the international media just after the shooting.
Well, SSP Adams was certainly right the second time. Jamaica has not only paid dearly for the event, but they paid twice: Firstly, in terms of the bad publicity which helped to reduce tourist arrivals; and secondly, in terms of the $40 million which have gone down the drain to pay for this Commission of Enquiry which has produced absolutely nothing new.
If the Government was really interested in a Commission of Enquiry which would have genuinely looked not only at that incident, but also at the environment which triggers actions likes these, then it would have sought some form of mutual agreement with all the parties which would have led to something much more substantial.
The Opposition also erred. I find it hard to believe that the JLP was so willing to accept Justice Julius Isaac as chairman of the commission, without even knowing anything about the man. Then trying to make a roundabout turn when it was later revealed that he may have held anti-Seaga sentiments.
When the JLP was challenging Dr. Garnet Brown's politics, they really should have been looking at that of Justice Isaac, who was an overwhelming influence on the proceedings, except for those moments when he dozed off.
When I came across a reference to Laurie Guntz's error-riddled book, "Born Fi Dead," on page "X" of the foreword to the report, it suggested that this may have been an enquiry which had resorted to name calling in the absence of evidence from both sides of the fence. However, I must confess that they did not stick to this line and eventually gave the best report they could have given in the circumstances.
The primary concern of the commission must certainly to find out whether or not the security forces conducted themselves appropriately, in carrying out their functions during the period in questions and how did their actions lead to the death of 27 Jamaicans, probably the horrific events in our history.
The commissioners were guided by the provisions of the Constabulary Force Act in explaining what were expected of members of the Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF) involved in the operation, as follows:
"The duties of the police under this Act shall be to keep watch by day and by night, to preserve the peace, apprehend or summon before a Justice, persons found committing any offence or whom they may reasonably suspect of having committed an offence or who may be charged with committing any offence...and to do and perform all duties appertaining to the office of a Constable."
In terms of the members of the Jamaica Defence Force they referred to the Defence Act, which states: The Jamaica Defence Force shall be charged with the defence of and maintenance of order in Jamaica and with such other duties as may from time to time be defined by the Defence Board.
The Prime Minister (or his representative), as the Minister of Defence, gives directions to the Chief of Staff pursuant to subsection(2) of the Defence Act and pursuant to that subsection the Chief of Staff comply with those directions, by assisting the JCF from time to time in the discharge of its law enforcement functions.
In terms of the findings, here is a sample of the most crucial ones:
Chapter four of the report deals with the causes and circumstances relating to the criminal activities, including the presence and/or use of illegal weapons, ammunitions and narcotic drugs within the affected communities:
The commissioners found drugs as being at the base of the confrontation.
"To the extent that the violence was intended to protect the drugs from seizure by the security forces, we find that the violence could be said to be linked to external connections dealing in drugs.
"Second, there was evidence from which one could reasonably find that the illicit weapons said to have been hidden in the Golden Age Home came from the United States of America. To the extent that these weapons were imported for the purpose of the organised crime syndicate, a similar conclusion could be reached.
"Finally, the evidence was that 'area dons' and others involved in organised crime syndicates do engage in money laundering, extortion of money and other elements of organised crime, such as credit card fraud, racketeering, stealing motor vehicles and making false passports. However, there was no evidence linking those activities to the upsurge of violence during the period of 7-10 July. Consequently, we are unable to find that the violence that erupted was linked to them."
In terms of the conduct of the security forces in carrying out their law enforcement functions, the commissioners found:
"On the whole of the evidence, respecting the manner in which the security forces fulfilled their law enforcement functions up to and including 5 July, 2001, we find that they carried out their functions satisfactorily in all circumstances."
In terms of the reasons and motives for the presence of the security forces in the vicinity of Denham Town and Tivoli Gardens and their environs during the period, the commissioners found:
"The numbers of soldiers and policemen involved reflected the nature of the task to be done, which was to execute cordons and searches for guns and ammunition in 19 areas in West Kingston."
The commissioners felt that "there was no evidence of indiscriminate use of violence (a characterisation of state terrorism); that violence against the security forces was perpetrated by groups of armed civilians who provoked the response; and that there was no credible evidence of violence directed by any member of the Government or of the PNP.
The commissioners concluded that the security forces came under "heavy gunfire from armed civilians," that they spent inordinately long periods taking cover from the gunfire, that they were generally impeded in the execution of their planned operation and that, "because of continuous gunfire aimed in their direction," they were prevented from removing the seriously wounded and dead who had fallen on the streets.
They felt that, "based on evidence before us, the essential cause of the violence in Denham Town, Tivoli and its environs during 7-10 July, 2001, was the presence of drugs, the proliferation of guns and ammunition in the hands of civilians residing in the area and the desire of the owners to protect them."
In terms of the loss of life, the commissioners found that, "there was no evidence that the loss of lives of 27 civilians was caused by the action of the security forces only."
"The results of ballistics tests do no demonstrate conclusively, that the bullets recovered from the bodies of the deceased persons were fired by any gun used by the security forces or any armed civilians."
The commissioners also found that:
"Bodies found on the streets of Denham Town in areas where there was intensive gunfire between the security forces and armed civilians, were more than not involved in either the assault on the security forces or caught in cross-fire between the opposing forces. The continued gunfire delayed the removal of the bodies.
"The bullets taken from the bodies of Corporal Mark Henry and Lance Corporal Kevin Lawrence (JDF) did not come from any of the weapons that were submitted for testing."
Were the rights of any person in the affected communities violated?
The commissioners were not even able to say whether the security forces had violated the rights of the young men whom churchmen found lying on their stomachs on the hot asphalt in afternoon sun.
However, they felt that "the right to life guaranteed to the gunmen by subsection 13 of the Constitution was not violated because, "in our view, the actions of the security forces were justified..."
As regard innocent by-standers who may have lost their lives during the violence, they concluded that, "the 'shoot-out between gunmen and the members of the security forces, we make two observations: first, there is no proof that these persons died as a result of the action of any members of the security forces; and, second, assuming such proof had been made, their deaths were probably justifiable under section 14(2)(c) of the Constitution."
Perhaps, the best we can hope for from this report is in terms of the recommendations, albeit recommendations which are not very original. Especially their suggestions in terms of a "more peaceful order for the affected communities":
"We recommend, as a matter of urgency, that the Government implement a structured job creation programme to be pursued within inner-city communities of the Corporate Area with emphasis on West Kingston."
Well, we have been suggesting to respective Governments that it is the first step in any attempt to deal with the criminality and violence plaguing our society. The Prime Minister has suggested that crime is not linked to poverty. But maybe, now that his commission has suggested, again, that it is the basis of crime, his Government might finally start taking it, seriously.
