John Rapley - Foreign FocusIT HAS been clear for some time now that the question in the White House is not whether, but when to eliminate Saddam Hussein. That the Iraqi leader is a threat to his neighbours, scarcely anyone doubts. That he possesses and is seeking further weapons of mass destruction, and is willing to use them, is equally clear. But that the American government has a solid pretext to go after him is less obvious to most observers.
The effort to somehow tie Saddam Hussein to Osama bin Laden thereby justifying a pre-emptive strike on Iraq as part of a broader war on terror has come up short for want of evidence. Even if many governments sympathise with the goal of toppling Saddam, the priority accorded to his immediate removal by the US administration may have as much to do with personal politics as with strategic planning. Since assuming office, US President George W. Bush has set his sights on the man who tried to have his father killed.
Britain aside, the US' allies are judging that the time is not right to go after Saddam. With Afghanistan still fragile and the Middle East in conflict, they fear opening another front may stretch coalition forces too thin. Equally, given the effectiveness with which Saddam has exploited the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, he retains appeal in the Arab 'street.'
In the absence of what Arabs would see as a just resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, an attack on Iraq at this time could redound upon the US.
Nevertheless, the American administration maintains that time is running against it. The longer an attack on Saddam is postponed, the more time he has to acquire the weapons of mass destruction that could widen any conflict beyond Iraqi borders. Of course, US anxiety creates a self-fulfilling prophecy of sorts. If Saddam sees the US is determined to eliminate him, he has every incentive to raise the conflict to a level he might ordinarily avoid, for fear of his own destruction. And that conflict now appears pretty much inevitable.
What, then, are the options available to the US? Option one, the simplest, would be to sponsor a coup to overthrow Saddam from within his regime. Unfortunately, that looks all but impossible. Saddam's control over his inner circle, and the security and intelligence establishments of his country, is so complete that a coup plot would almost certainly be doomed to failure.
Option two, the sort of approach used in Kosovo and Afghanistan, has proved popular among the Americans of late. This would involve supplying air support to Iraqi rebels, who would do the ground-fighting. But politics probably renders this option unfeasible. There are potential proxy armies within Iraq willing to co-operate with the Americans. In particular, Kurdish rebels in the north of the country would be delighted to see the back of Saddam.
However, America's allies in the region would find the resulting balance of power to their disfavour. In particular, Turkey, whose air bases would probably be essential to a US aerial campaign, does not want to see the Kurds strengthen their hand in the region. This is because Kurdish separatists are at war not only with Iraq, but with Turkey. Turkey will not come on board without assurances that the US will refuse Kurdish Independence; the Kurds, however, are unlikely to come on board without the promise of this very Independence.
So that probably means the US will have to launch a major military invasion of its own. Recent suggestions in Washington that a campaign of massive bombing could sufficiently destabilise the Iraqi government, causing its collapse, were quickly dismissed by the Defence Secretary, Donald Rumsfeld. But a land invasion, reportedly involving up to 250,000 troops, would be both costly and complicated. At a time when the US is struggling to emerge from recession, such an operation would deplete the US Treasury. Moreover, it would rely on the co-operation of allies, whose territory would be used to launch the invasion. For now, regional allies are balking. And if an invasion ran into difficulties, they could well be forced to withdraw their support for a US campaign.
It is a high risk gamble that the US administration is proposing. It could rid the world of Saddam, but it could also break this White House.
John Rapley is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of Government, UWI, Mona.
