John RapleyTHE NORTH Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) was formed in 1949 by the United States, Canada and ten west European countries to form a united front against the Soviet Union. In the dying months of World War II, the Soviet Red Army had occupied six east European countries. By 1948, rather than withdrawing its troops, Moscow had installed puppet regimes.
That, and the blockade of West Berlin in 1948, filled western Europe's still-fragile governments with a fear of Soviet expansionism.
A few years later, the Soviet bloc countries formed the Warsaw Pact in response, and the Cold War stand-off began. NATO became a linchpin in the foreign policies of the West. It was the military alliance that would safeguard capitalism and democracy.
In the US, there always were opponents to their country's expensive involvement in NATO. The US stationed troops all through western Europe on what would be the front with her enemy in the event of a war. American isolationists asked if the cost was worth it. European economic integration and the shift of American economic interest towards Asia meant that the economic ties between the US and Europe were diminishing in importance each year. In a worst-case scenario, said the unilateralists, if the Americans abandoned Europe and the Soviets took over, they would still not cross the Atlantic Ocean. Europe, they said, needed the US more than the US needed Europe.
Nevertheless, the Cold War kept the communist threat at the forefront of American minds, and no administration questioned its commitment to the alliance. That all changed with the fall of the Berlin Wall. The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the end of communism left the Cold Warriors without a cause. NATO suddenly found itself rudderless.
It struggled to re-invent itself. By drawing in new members from among the former Soviet bloc states, it positioned itself as the bulwark against a resurgence of communism (Moscow, not surprisingly, saw it as an alliance against Russia, and disapproved). Later, with its interventions in the former Yugoslavia, NATO also set itself on the course of preserving peace within Europe.
More and more Americans were left asking why they bothered with NATO at all. With America's military interest shifting towards the Middle East, they wondered what use a European alliance served. Some conservatives maintained that NATO drew together countries united by capitalism, democracy and the values of the West.
The subtext to this argument, though, was that this alliance defended what had once been Christendom against a newly assertive Islam. While some foreign policy gurus maintained that a "clash of civilisations" was about to begin, such suggestions were still considered politically incorrect. Even if the Bush administration appears to have been influenced by this kind of thinking, in public, it insists it has no war with Islam.
IDENTITY CRISIS
So NATO continues to suffer from an identity crisis. With a war on Iraq brewing, it now faces an opportunity to give itself a new reason for living. Turkey, fearing the spillover effects of a war on its neighbour, has called for reinforcements on its borders. For their part, NATO commanders want to be in on the action, as it would give their organisation a new lease on life.
The Americans, meanwhile, are watching to see if they can turn NATO to their ends. However, alliance decisions must be unanimous. Since Germany and France maintain that a diplomatic solution to the stand-off with Iraq is still possible, they have opposed an immediate deployment on the grounds that it would be provocative. Belgium is backing them up.
The Americans, obviously, are incensed. For years now, the Americans have evinced a growing desire for independence from alliances. They seem to prefer building "coalitions of the willing," as President Bush calls them, ad hoc alliances brought together for specific tasks. NATO commitments tie them down and limit their freedom of manoeuvre.
At a deeper level, the old question of America's place in the world has resurfaced. US conservatives are inclined to see Europe as the old world, while the Europeans no-one more than the French tend to see the Americans as arrogant and bullying.
Whether or not a common civilisation unites them sufficiently to preserve the alliance remains to be seen. But I doubt this is the last we will see of these tensions.
John Rapley is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of Government, UWI, Mona.
