Garth Rattray THE CRIME Management Unit (CMU) affair has become a national soap opera of sorts. The flamboyant Senior Superintendent of Police Renato Adams can always be counted on to utter 'made for press' statements like "I will have a million things to say" concerning his intent to comment on the way the CMU was disbanded. The Commissioner on the other hand constantly attempts to exude calm and decorum in all his prepared statements to the press.
DOOMED TO FAILURE
The CMU debacle provides an important lesson worth learning. Its dissolution did not surprise me. The very concept of special squads dooms them to failure. The reasoning that spawns such units is fuelled by desperation and muddled by an unclear appreciation of the basis for the criminal activities that infest our land.
Mr. Adams is both a product and a casualty of our harsh times. If he believed that he could have made a real difference with the CMU then history should have taught him that he was sadly mistaken. All special units from Echo Squad (1976) to Operation Intrepid (1999) have failed. He was chosen for this assignment because he is to the police force what a pit bull terrier is to canines. He was used to intimidate the criminal elements and 'sicked' on the gunmen. It seems doubtful that the CMU was disbanded at this time because it did not fulfil their mandate (it never did) or because the hard-working policemen in the unit appeared to be under stress (they always were).
I feel that the CMU was disbanded because it was a mistake, because too many questionable killings took place on their watch, because it was too controversial, because it became fodder for critics and possibly because it was garnering too much negative public sentiment so close to the Local Government elections. We were told that the unit failed to carry out its established purpose of "targeting dons and dealing with extortion, car-jackings, guns and deportees who were involved in crime". But to truly succeed at that task, any such unit must have as its sole mandate the gathering of information through covert operatives (intelligence). Guns and bullets (brute force) should not be part of their portfolio.
HIGHLY TRAINED AND TACTICAL
The famous American crime-fighter, Elliot Ness, was only able to defeat the most ruthless gangster/don of that era, Al Capone, using tax evasion charges and not bullets. Perhaps we here in Jamaica could learn from Mr. Ness.
There is certainly a place for highly trained police with tactical and armed-response capabilities, Special Weapons And Tactics (SWAT) teams, trained to handle high-risk situations beyond the skills of the regular constabulary. They "reduce the risk of injury or loss of life to citizens, police officers and suspects alike" (quote taken from a SWAT unit website). These teams would only become involved if and when the police were in immediate need of a tactical advantage; they are trained to minimise the loss of lives.
Because of their excellent record, such units have survived for many years in the United States and in countries as far away as Hong Kong, Taipei, Singapore and Korea where they act as an essential adjunct to the regular police.
Like the eleven other special squads/anti-crime units before it, the Crime Management Unit (CMU) was destined for early termination. As they say, "When you fight fire with fire, everything burns".
And now the CMU is itself under fire because it is believed that they may have gone too far. All that our anti-crime units have done is to destroy a few rotten fruits and possibly a few good ones as well. Our dysfunctional society will continue to bear bitter fruits of discontent, ripe for the picking by unscrupulous, opportunistic reprobates until we address the root problems and begin the healing process.
Dr Garth A. Rattray is a medical doctor with a family practice.
