Stephen Vasciannie DURING HIS recent visit to London, President Bush took the opportunity to restate the position of his administration on issues concerning Iraq and the problem of terrorism. On one view, President Bush's basic perspective is quite understandable: the United States of America is a target for terrorists, and was susceptible to the risk of attack from the pre-existing regime in Baghdad; therefore, as a matter of self-defence, the United States was entitled to act, both to counter the terrorist threat and to remove an enemy reasonably regarded as a threat to American security.
The idea that the United States may take military action against perceived threats is consistent with basic notions of realpolitik in international affairs. From the American perspective, as adumbrated, for instance, by Richard Perle, there is little point in waiting for your enemy to attack you, when there is evidence that the enemy is busy organising terrorist strikes or may be working on weapons of mass destruction or other means of inflicting damage on the United States.
Thus, out of this perspective has emerged in public form the doctrine of pre-emption: in appropriate cases the United States will use force against countries even where America faces no immediate threat of military attack. Force will be used as a means of pre-empting future attacks, if this is deemed consistent with the security needs of the United States.
PRE-EMPTION
As a political matter, the doctrine of pre-emption is open to divergent viewpoints. It faces a number of objections on grounds of verifiability, fairness and world security. So, for instance, when the United States makes the decision to attack another country on the assumption that the latter is a threat, how will the rest of the world know that the information available to the United States actually justifies the American action?
This issue has arisen in the case of Iraq, where there have been lengthy discussions about whether Iraq was seeking to purchase nuclear material through African sources (now refuted). Similarly, in response to the question, what did the attacker know and when did they know it, the Hutton Inquiry in Britain has had to pursue labyrinthine trails in pursuit of evidence that Saddam Hussein was, realistically speaking, a threat to Western security.
As to fairness, the doctrine of pre-emption prompts the question whether it is reasonable for one country, or a small group of countries, to undertake military force even where a military attack is not imminent. And there is a related matter, raised by H.K. Burke in The Gleaner on more than one occasion: if the United States can have the right of pre-emption, is it not fair to assume that other countries also have this right? If, in keeping with notions of sovereign equality of states, every country reserves the right of pre-emption, this would make the world a much more dangerous place. But, if to avoid this, the United States were to claim the doctrine of pre-emption as belonging only to a limited group of countries, then what philosophy, what arguments, could support giving a special rule on the use of force to the privileged?
Related political objections may also be briefly mentioned. Many people are reluctant to accept the doctrine of pre-emption because they fear that it will be used for ulterior motives. Already, this is evident in the debate on the intervention in Iraq: critics of the American action are keen to emphasise the all-encompassing significance of oil in world politics, and many also reach for presumed economic links between American corporations and post-Saddamite reconstruction. Similarly, those supporting pre-emption have also been pressed to convince sceptics that the Anglo-American intervention in Iraq is not a Christian militaristic response, a crusade, to a perceived jihad. In short, the Bush and Blair administrations have had constantly to explain that this is a Just War, but not a Holy War.
BODY BAGS
In such circumstances, war protagonists will almost invariably be placed on the defensive. As fighting continues, the sceptics will start counting body bags, and soon, analogies come to be drawn between the current crisis and earlier instances of the use of force, such as Vietnam. And then, as elections approach, even those opposition politicians who supported the military action in a show of patriotism and unity, start cynically to distance themselves from the action. They start to see deficiencies of implementation, and even highlight that they had reservations about particular approaches from the outset, in the hope that they can ride prevailing political currents to popular success.
It is easy to argue that such considerations flow substantially from the doctrine of pre-emption, for, in cases where there is no immediate threat, requiring self-defence, the attacking state will always be pressed to explain whether the intervention is really worth the price. In the present era, the risks inherent in pre-emption are also publicly exposed: in the weeks and months following President Bush's declaration that fighting was over in Iraq, the BBC mentioned that President Bush had made this declaration almost every time its news broadcast noted the death of an American or British soldier in Iraq. No doubt, this kind of repetition can influence the views of even those initially in support of the war.
MASS GRAVES
The case against the war seems to grow with the passage of time, and there is evidence that the United States is preparing the way for a substantial reduction of its troops in the next eight months or so. And yet, this would not necessarily mean that the war was ill-considered. After all, the revelations concerning the number of people killed and buried in mass graves by Saddam Hussein must be of concern even to critics of President Bush. Indeed, on one view, the war could be justified as an instance of humanitarian intervention, rather than as a war of pre-emption.
Moreover, although the interventionist forces have not (yet) found compelling evidence concerning the presence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, this does not automatically mean that the war was unjustifiable. The question should be considered by reference to what the protagonists knew, or believed, at the time of the intervention, and, it should be noted that the actions of the Saddam Hussein government in the period between 1991 and 2003 provided some support for the notion that Iraq had something to hide with respect to its weapons programme.
On balance, therefore, reasonable people may differ as to whether the intervention is justifiable, for there are plausible arguments on either side of the question. In assessing the issues, though, it is desirable to avoid both the knee-jerk reaction that America is always right or wrong, a reaction that has seriously clouded discussions to date. It is also desirable to remember the terms of the United Nations Charter, and the legal implications arising from the Charter, a matter that merits further consideration at a later date.
Stephen Vasciannie is Professor of International Law and Head of the Department of Government at the UWI, Mona. He is also a consultant in the Attorney-General's Chambers.
