John Rapley - Foreign Focus NOW THAT former Iraqi president Saddam Hussein is in US custody, the question being asked is whether the U.S. has decapitated the snake of the Iraqi insurgency.
The most likely scenario appears to be that attacks on allied forces will diminish over time, but not disappear. Prior to Saddam's capture by U.S. soldiers, understanding of the insurgency remained limited, and so depended to some degree on informed speculation. However, the American judgment was that while Saddam probably did not play an organisational role in the resistance, he served as a rallying-figure for Baathist opponents to the occupation. Capturing him was thus a top priority for the Americans, in part because they reckoned this would demoralise the insurgency.
However, since his arrest on the weekend, a slightly different picture of Saddam's role in the guerrilla war has begun to emerge. Although Saddam appears to have provided little information to his interrogators, several documents found in his possession have shed light on the organisation of the resistance.
These confirm that Saddam probably did little to direct the insurgency. However, he was apparently being kept informed of it, and had established a network of financiers to continue funnelling resources to guerrilla cells. The Americans claim to have already begun penetrating this financial network, which will cut back the resources available to the foot soldiers.
The American estimation is that most of the insurgents are in fact not 'die-harders' but pragmatists looking for work in an environment where jobs are hard to find. Deprived of payouts, they will thus begin to abandon the resistance. So, to the degree that the Americans are able to continue penetrating the Baathist financial network, the resistance will retreat.
There are, however, other possibilities. One is that the insurgents reporting directly to Saddam may only be a slice of a greater Baathist resistance. A second is that the capture of Saddam may actually embolden new forms of resistance. Yet a third is that Baathists account for less of the resistance than the Americans have so far estimated.
With respect to the first possibility, some observers believe that the insurgency is being directed largely by mid-level Baathists who had no particular interest in seeing Saddam return to power. If this is so, it may mean that the weakening of a network of Saddam-loyalists may only tackle a part of the opposition.
The second possibility, that new forms of resistance may emerge, is one of which the Americans are wary. If one were to sum up the average Iraqi's attitude to the American occupation in a word, it would probably be 'ambivalence'. Most Iraqis have been happy to see the back of Saddam, but resent the American occupation. Yet to the extent they feared that an early American departure might allow Saddam to return to power, they have grudgingly tolerated the American presence.
Now that Saddam is guarded by U.S. troops, they may see less of a reason for the allies to stick around. However, the capture of Saddam is not likely to hasten the departure of foreign troops from Iraqi soil. A new form of resistance, or simply an expansion of the existing one, remains a distinct possibility. Forestalling it will necessitate the Americans winning the hearts and minds of the Iraqi people.
This, however, poses a dilemma. An aggressive assault on the resistance entails greater loss of innocent life; easing up to avoid antagonising ordinary Iraqis, on the other hand, affords guerrillas more freedom for manoeuvre. Of late, stung by criticisms at home over the number of American casualties in Iraq, the American command has opted for the aggressive approach. Yet the Pentagon is mindful that in the process, it is making new enemies.
There remains the third possibility, that Baathists represent a less significant part of the resistance than was first supposed. Some speculate that Islamists, foreign fighters, criminal networks or disaffected thugs account for much of the fighting. These networks will not likely be touched by the break-up of a Saddam-led Baathist network.
Therefore, it is not surprising that, when asked to predict how Saddam's capture would affect the course of the war, American commanders remained fairly circumspect. It is too early to tell, and serious risks remain ahead.
John Rapley is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of Government UWI, Mona.
