Robert Buddan, Contributor
HAITI'S PRESIDENT, Jean-Bertrand Aristide recently said, "There have been 32 coups d'etat in Haiti in 200 years of Independence, but we must now go from one democratic election to another democratic election."
Haiti's 32 coups amount to one every six or so years. That's almost as frequently as democratic countries hold elections.
Aristide wants Haiti to begin a democratic electoral tradition. For this to happen, government and opposition must accept the democratic rules of the game.
The democratic rules call for free, fair and regularly held elections; that those out of power allow those in power to govern; rulers and opposition respect the constitution and law and order; there be independent courts to settle disputes; civilian organisations govern and not military ones; parties compete; and that there be tolerance and respect for differences.
DEMOCRATIC FAILURE IN HAITI
When Haiti held its first free elections in 1991 and other presidential and legislative elections in 1995, 1997 and 2000, they were generally regarded as free, fair and flawed. Despite the flaws, it was never disputed that Aristide and Rene Preval won their presidential elections, and that their Lavalas party won majorities in legislative elections.
The elections were never fraudulent as the opposition claims. But there are important lessons to learn about those elections.
One lesson of democracy is that there must be an adequate infrastructure for elections.
There is so little data on the Haitian population that it has not been possible to even know the size of the electorate. Estimates agree on 4.5-5 million.
Furthermore, the Provisional Electoral Council (CEP) and the OAS were not even able to determine how many of over 11,000 polling sites had opened on time, or opened at all, and how many voters participated in elections.
The 1997 estimate of voting was as low as six per cent and was 60 per cent for 2000. In some elections ballots in a number of places were counted by candlelight because of power outages. There was a lot of counting to do. In 2000, Haiti elected as many as 7,500 posts for local and central government.
The need for strong voting infrastructure is important since uncertainties and system failures can give cause to bad losers to shout foul. Haiti's population of more than eight million, the fact that three-quarters of the country is mountainous and roads and land transportation are poor means that when a country does not have much experience in conducting democratic elections, these circumstances make things even worse.
Another lesson of democracy is that the electoral system must be appropriate to the circumstances. It is one thing to have elections. It is another to select the appropriate formula for elections.
Haiti uses a very demanding majoritarian system for legislative and presidential elections. For example, let's say there are three candidates, A, B and C receiving 45, 35 and 20 per cent of the votes respectively in a constituency.
In Jamaica, candidate A would win having passed the post first. But in France and the ex-French colonies, including Haiti, candidate A would not be elected because he has not received a majority (50 per cent or more) of the votes. In this situation, candidate C is eliminated and candidates A and B have a run-off election. In Haiti, it is logistically challenging to hold one round of elections much less a second round of run-off elections.
Run-off, two-round elections make elections more costly and provide additional opportunities for fraud and for losers to undermine the eventual result. It is no wonder that many of the ex-French colonies in Africa do so badly with elections.
POLITICAL CULTURE OF DEMOCRACY
In countries where violence is part of the culture, two-round elections only create more opportunities for electoral violence. This is worse when the military (disbanded in 1995), has a history of interference and the police force, as present circumstances show, is under-trained and ill-equipped.
Countries cannot simply transplant the institutions of other countries to their own soil and expect them to work the same way. Haiti needs to think about a new and more workable electoral formula. Much of the present controversy goes back to the problems created by this electoral formula in 2000.
Another lesson of democracy is that there must be a political culture in which the rules of the game between winners and losers are respected. Candidates must be willing to submit to elections and accept the results.
Many of us bad mouth Jamaican elections without realising how well we accept the rules of the game. One overseas scholar noted that it must have been difficult for Michael Manley and Edward Seaga to accept defeats in 1980 and 1989, but they did. This is not the same in Haiti.
Haitian-born professor of politics, Alex Dupuy said: "The failed OAS-CARICOM mediation throughout 2001 and 2002 make it clear that (the opposition-Democratic Convergence) was the main obstacle to a successful resolution of the conflict. At every turn in the process, the CD either refused to endorse agreements that were arrived at or issued new demands that it insisted had to be met before it could agree to endorse any proposed resolution."
Since 2000, the opposition has refused to participate in elections, to share positions in Aristide's government at his invitation and to name representatives to the Provisional Electoral Council that administers Haiti's elections. It has practiced bad democratic faith and does not respect the rules of the game.
Yet another lesson is that democracy needs time to take root. A cultural tradition needs time to establish itself. North American and European democracies evolved over many years. In Haiti, 10 years is hardly enough time.
After Jean Claude Duvalier was run out of Haiti in 1986, a new constitution and new elections in 1987 failed due to military interference. After Aristide and Lavalas were overwhelmingly elected in 1990, they were overthrown in 1991. It has only been since 1995 that Haitian democracy has proceeded uninterrupted, though not without destabilization.
In 1995 an entirely new set of legislators were elected. Aristide was inexperienced and he was succeeded in 1996 by a first-time president in Rene Preval. New constitutions, a succession of different Provisional Electoral Councils, the new experience of running free and fair elections, the new experience of voting, all require time to work themselves into the Haitian political culture. They have not been given that time.
Should undemocratic forces be allowed to overthrow Aristide, this will set back the young electoral tradition; and should Aristide be forced to resign, that will only reward those who prefer violence.
EXTERNAL SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY
Aristide was freely and popularly elected with 92 per cent of the votes in 2000 and is entitled to serve out his term. As he said, "I will leave here on February 7, 2006. People must respect that principle, one man, one vote."
He has already made many compromises to the opposition and when he says he will die rather than resign, he is really saying he will face death for the principle of democracy. Aristide is not flawless but he is the best chance for democracy and needs external support.
The next lesson is that a young democracy needs external support.
It is wrong when Mr. Seaga says that Aristide must resign. If memory serves me right, Mr. Seaga had said on a television interview some years ago that it was better to have a bad man (the then military dictator) than a mad man (Aristide, who was in exile and who the CIA falsely reported to be psychotic).
This kind of sentiment does not serve Caribbean democracy.
Outside of the Caribbean, support has been lacking too. Alex Dupuy says, "The strategy, by both Convergence (now Democratic Platform) and the Bush administration that supports and directs it, is clear: to achieve by means of political and economic strangulation what they cannot achieve through the ballot box and then to call that a victory for democracy." This view is supported by members of the US Congress like Barbara Lee and Maxine Waters. The US administration has frozen US$500 million in aid to Haiti and hopes that poverty will make people desperate enough to use violence against democracy itself. These lessons might be too late to save Aristide but until they are learnt, no one can save Haitian democracy.
Robert Buddan lectures in the Department of Government, UWI, Mona. You can send your comments to Robert.Buddan@uwimona.edu.jm
