By Allan Douglas, Contributor 
Precisely because of its unique training, organisation and high standards of discipline, the JDF is able to be involved in non-traditional roles and to be able to effectively carry out these tasks. - File
THE GLEANER of Monday, August 9, 2004 carried a very interesting story under the headline, "Rethinking the Security Sector". It reported on the review being done by the National Security Strategic Review Committee of the Government, to report on 'national security arrangements'.
The Gleaner's story highlighted the parts of Jamaicans for Justice's (JFJ) submission to the Committee which dealt particularly with the Jamaica Defence Force (JDF) and the Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF). I believe the JFJ's submission was well intended, and the interest displayed by such civic-minded bodies on matters such as security should be encouraged. However, I wish to take issue with some of the positions presented by the JFJ as it affects the JDF, with the hope that it might possibly stimulate discussion on the issues they raised.
JFJ's proposal
The JFJ's proposal calls for "...a redefinition of the army, and a complete restructuring to meet its newly defined role...".
It further states that in regards to the "...army, in the absence of any external threat, save that posed by illegal drug and arms trafficking, the redefinition needs to take into account the reallocation of resources to counter threats, e.g. strengthening the Coast Guard, strengthening the intelligence capabilities, strengthening the Air Wing. The remainder of a smaller army (perhaps larger reserve forces, rather than permanent members) could be trained for deployment in periods of national emergency, such as earthquakes and hurricanes, and as support troops for international peacekeeping activities, such as the U.N. operation in Haiti."
What is intended, if I correctly understand the JFJ's position, is that the roles of the JDF be redefined and possibly increased. With the redefining of roles and with the possibility of others being added, the regular army (primarily infantry troops) would be scaled down and their functions would be carried out by a 'larger reserve force'. There would also be a strengthening of the intelligence capabilities, and strengthening of the Air Wing and Coast Guard.
When examining such redefinition of roles, it is important from the start to understand that the JDF is a relatively small military force (or army) with a naval element (Coast Guard) and air element (Air Wing). It is trained, organised, and equipped to function as a military force, and more specifically as an army. Its sole purpose and the reason for its organisation, training and equipment are to defend Jamaica against security aggression from within or outside the country. This is the traditional purpose of military forces. The employment of the JDF (or its roles) when it is not involved with its purpose is an entirely different matter.
Precisely because of its unique training, organisation and high standards of discipline, the JDF is able to be involved in non-traditional roles and to be able to effectively carry out these tasks. I would like to point out that if the sole purpose of the JDF were to be ignored, or worse, done away with during this redefining process, what would in effect happen would be the removal of its military ethos. Why would it any longer be necessary then for the JDF to be equipped, trained, organised, and operated as a military force if its reason for being was no longer relevant or to support a military purpose?
Non-military roles
In other words, Jamaica does not need the JDF if its sole purpose is no longer to be that of the traditional role of an army. Furthermore, if the JDF were to be retained solely to perform non-traditional military roles, it would soon be discovered that because it no longer possessed its military ethos (which is impossible to retain unless there is a true military purpose), it would be unable to effectively and efficiently carry out the non-traditional military roles. This is because the high levels of discipline, physical standards and personal character qualities, such as loyalty, honesty and courage among military men has to do with the unique nature of the profession of arms the fact that one is prepared to die while fighting for one's country. If then the true military purpose were to be removed from the JDF, the drive and motivation that comes with such military standards would certainly be absent. At that point, it would be better to disband a unit that has lost its military ethos than to have an outfit that would be nothing more than a state-sponsored mob in uniform.
Subordination of
military purpose
Therefore, those who set out to redefine the roles of the JDF should be careful not to subordinate or do away with its real purpose. Say, for instance, one bought a vehicle specifically designed for racing and trained its driver to participate in such events, but found that while the vehicle and driver were not involved in such activities that they could be employed for other uses. For example, the vehicle with its driver could be used instead for chores such as driving the children to school or doing grocery shopping or other non-racing functions that satisfied a particular need. However, over a period of time, the driver would realise that his employer no longer held racing as the main purpose of his employment, and would either opt for finding another job or forget about the skills required for being a racing driver, hence keeping his car in a condition only good enough to perform the less demanding functions. What, however, happens if the driver is called upon to race? Will he and his car be up to standard? I doubt it, and it might be better to be without the racecar and driver at all than to place a sub-par errand driver in a race.
Reserve force
solution
Now I'd like to address the matter of increasing the size of the reserve force based on the reduction of the regular armed forces. This is not a new thought, but its attractiveness as an idea eludes me. Most likely, its appeal has something to do with the myth that savings are associated with this solution, or the fallacy that regular soldiers in peacetime sit idly in the barracks or spend their entire days just marching up and down. If you believe those myths, then it becomes easy for one to accept that it would be better just to call on soldiers when they are needed for battle a sort of 'instant mix' military, if you will. In any event, if the reserve forces were indeed to take over some of the functions of the done-away-with regular forces, does it not suggest a degree of permanency to their employment? It is certainly not a part-time function.
The reserve forces are made up of Jamaicans who volunteer their spare time in the service of their country. Theirs is not a full-time service. The members are required to attend training on specified evenings and certain weekends, as well as to attend an annual camp. The law dictates that reserve forces members can be called out for specified periods (28 days at a time) and that those periods can be extended as required.
Many members of the reserve forces have regular civilian jobs or employment. Most of the officers are professional men in their own right lawyers, doctors, engineers, company directors and so forth and when military service so demand, they give up their civilian professional duties and happily put on a uniform to carry out military duties. This is commendable and a praiseworthy act by any group of citizens indeed and I have the highest regard for their patriotism.
The JDF has been served well by its reserve forces over the years. What has to be understood again, however, is that these members are not full-time soldiers and that they were intended to supplement the regular forces, not necessarily to operate as independent entities. Whereas one is able to employ members of the reserve forces who are unemployed for extended periods, I am not confident that it would be desirable to do the same with those employed, especially the reserve officer corps. I am also not sure that the reserve force would continue to attract professional men to its ranks if those men would now more than ever be deployed on, say, peacekeeping duties overseas for extended periods of up to six months.
An increase of any area of the JDF, especially its Coast Guard and Air Wing, will call for an increase in administrative and logistical support for such units. So, whereas there might be some resources that can be reallocated from smaller regular infantry units, it certainly would not in any way be sufficient to cater for the support services required for those two units that depend on high-tech equipment and support. The need for administrative support for dispersed reserve elements, too, is also going to be greater, not to mention the increase of bases and installations that would most definitely be required.
Instant armies
There is a misconception that because the need for the army is not immediately required that we should do away with it; and in the assumption that it should ever be required in the future, it can easily be put together. Any nation can produce an army of a sort, but it takes time and much devotion to produce a worthwhile and professional outfit. I'm reminded of a story told to me of an American tourist who admired the lawns of Windsor Castle and asked one of the gardeners for the secret so he could grow some turf like that back home. The answer he got was, "Just water it, cut it, and roll it for about 400 years!"
Armies are built gradually with proud, motivating traditions and customs a form of super team spirit. It is this imponderable ingredient of morale that has made soldiers behave and respond better, when a crisis looms, than they would ever normally have done. Weapons and uniforms by themselves do not make an army. It is the soldiers who understand and have pride in their being or purpose that are the foundation of any military force. This driving force must be achieved and cannot be found overnight. It must be long lasting, and it cannot be broken and restarted.
It may be that the JDF is, like any army after more than 40 years of existence, in need of being reviewed. I am confident, however, that its current members will in no small way contribute to that exercise. The JDF to my mind is as relevant to Jamaica now as it was when it was formed in 1962. It will, however, only continue to grow in effectiveness if well-intended persons or organisations do not, albeit possibly unintentionally, obscure its real purpose.
Allan Douglas is a retired colonel of the JDF. E-mail him at lldouglas@aol.com.
