Arnold Bertram IN THE general elections of 2002, the criminal élite took the strategic decision to
maximise its influence within the legislature by using all the means at its disposal to ensure the election of candidates to the national Parliament who were sympathetic to its interests. These drug kingpins had acquired considerable influence over the electorate by using the fortunes amassed from the trade in illegal drugs to provide welfare services, build community infrastructure, woo front-line community and political leaders, corrupt public officials and finance the acquisition of modern arsenals.
The decision to extend their influence among the political directorate was 'strictly business' and they targeted candidates from both political parties with equal deliberateness.
The results of the elections showed that a clear and present danger had emerged within the Parliament and one which should cause concern to every law-
abiding citizen.
ENTER OPERATION KINGFISH
There was no doubt in the minds of the criminal élite that they had scored a victory in the post-election period for their public posture reflected the kind of bravado one associated with those who
considered themselves untouchable.
What brought them back to reality and derailed the enterprise to further corrupt vital institutions of the State was the partnership forged between local law enforcement agencies and their counterparts in the United States and Britain, which resulted in the creation of Operation Kingfish.
Operation Kingfish has
dismantled some of the major criminal networks and arrested several big drug dealers who are now facing extradition to answer charges of drug smuggling.
Unfortunately, the removal of a substantial part of the drug income is now contributing to an expansion of extortion and other criminal enterprises. This accounts for the majority of the homicides and other forms of criminal violence associated with the fight for turf.
The leadership succession process in both the PNP and the JLP has now created another
window of opportunity for the criminal élite to resume its campaign to expand its political influence, this time at the highest level.
Make no mistake. The drug
cartel has assessed all contenders from both political parties in order to make its choice as to which of the aspirants offers the best possibilities for collaboration. Against this background, every law-abiding Jamaican should pay the closest attention to the events which are unfolding in the constituencies where criminals have a stranglehold on the political process and are therefore in a position to
leverage this control.
THE MOTHER OF ALL GARRISONS
Let me begin with Tivoli Gardens, the mother of all garrisons, which, during the 1980s underwent a complete transformation. Up to then, its role had been to provide the muscle for the systematic intimidation and elimination of all political opposition, and to give oversight to the
cynical manipulation of the electoral process. The reward for these services came primarily in the form of lucrative state contracts as well as from substantial donations by the private sector to the constituency in one form or another.
All this changed when the dons of Tivoli Gardens negotiated the use of Jamaica as a transhipment port in the illegal trade in drugs, guns and ammunition that brought them new and vast sources of income. Simultaneously, the expansion of the market district created endless possibilities for extortion. With these independent sources of income, the relationship between criminals and politicians was radically altered. In the new relationship, the criminals perceived
themselves as equals of the politicians, with the right to sit with them at the table to discuss and agree on terms for the exchange of services.
The last partisan political
mission carried out by the garrison in Tivoli Gardens was the military expedition which, in May 1984, was sent to discipline recalcitrant Labourites in Rema. This is how the page one Gleaner editorial caption 'Madness in Rema' described the events:
"Seven persons have been killed in gun warfare between factions of the ruling Jamaica Labour Party in Tivoli, Rema and Rose Town areas of western Kingston ... The reports through Tuesday and Wednesday indicated that the police could scarcely cope beyond maintaining defensive positions in the Denham Town
station and all the time exchanging fire with gun-toting youths ... This frightening madness bore all the hallmarks of anarchy which should have been crushed with dispatch, whatever its source."
Since then, public concern has been less focused on Tivoli's partisan political role and more on the evidence of the sophisticated arsenal it possesses and which it uses with impunity.
TRANSFORMED GARRISON
The first opportunity to see the transformed garrison in action came in July 1987, on the occasion of Jim Brown's acquittal in the Home Circuit Court on King Street. The court's decision was greeted with a fuselage of gunshots which forced Chief Justice Zacca to hide under a table and the entire police contingent to take cover.
Confirmation of the existence of a modern arsenal came with three raids on Tivoli Gardens on March 17, 1993, September 30, 1994 and April 24-30, 1996 by the police. These yielded 2,877 rounds of ammunition of the type used in Thompson machine guns, M16 assault rifles, AK47 rifles, as well as a range of semi-automatic pistols.
By September 1994, Seaga had completely lost control of the monster he had created. In a letter sent to the Commissioner of Police, Trevor McMillan, he disclosed the names and whereabouts of thirteen men whom he demanded should be taken into custody immediately. He also disclosed that the ringleader's name was Michael Coke, aka 'Dudus', son of Lloyd 'Jim Brown' Coke. Seaga warned "he was leaving the island and if the police failed to take in Dudus by the end of the week, he would be publishing a full-page advertisement offering a reward of $25,000 for his capture.
In one last desperate bid to assert some of the undisputed authority he had enjoyed for three decades in western Kingston, Seaga nominated his protégé Desmond Mckenzie, the energetic mayor of Kingston and St. Andrew, to succeed him as Member of Parliament. The power brokers made it clear that McKenzie did not qualify since what they wanted was a potential prime minister for whom they could guarantee a political mono-poly in the constituency and considerable resources in support of his bid to become prime minister. The question is: What would they demand in return for such support?
Bruce Golding, the new Leader of the JLP, has now been installed as Member of Parliament for Western Kingston. Since his elevation, his posture and public utterances in the confrontations between law enforcement agencies and criminals must force us to ask which side he is on. He would do well to reflect on the fact that not even Seaga could ride the tiger that he seems intent on mounting.
ARNETT GARDENS
AND SPANISH TOWN
The next area for concern must be Arnett Gardens in South St. Andrew. It was after the 1972 elections that Tony Spaulding, the new Member of Parliament, successfully emulated the Tivoli model. Spaulding was very much in the tradition of D.C. Tavares, Jr., both being ambitious and energetic ministers of housing. Tavares has never been given sufficient credit for pioneering the political garrison. This he achieved in the constituency of South-west St. Andrew after he became Member of Parliament in 1959.
Neither Tavares nor Spaulding had the advantage of a market district in their constituencies. It is the existence of such a district which has made a critical difference to the economies of Tivoli Gardens and Matthews Lane in Western Kingston. South and Southwest St. Andrew have had to rely far more on government projects.
The fact that Omar Davies, the present Member of Parliament for South St. Andrew, has made it clear that he has no intention of providing patronage or giving comfort to criminal networks, accounts for much of the division and disintegration taking place in the constituency.
The size and quality of the
arsenal in Arnett Gardens was indicated by a police raid in January 2001, which produced two AK 47 assault rifles with
telescopic lenses and equipment to launch rockets; four rockets, one semi-automatic pistol, eight
magazines, three silencers and several assorted rounds of ammunition. This kind of weaponry and ammunition, in the hands of
factions fighting for turf, is a
threat which must be confronted
immediately and decisively.
The situation in Spanish Town gives as much cause for concern. It was Bruce Golding who, after the 1983 elections, began the process of establishing a garrison in Central St. Catherine, again based on the Tivoli model. Golding, like Spaulding and Tavares, was also a politically-ambitious minister of housing. When he left the JLP in 1995 to form the National Democratic Movement, the poli-tical and paramilitary apparatus in the constituency was in the hands of criminals. This is what Babsy Grange inherited when she defeated Golding in the elections of 1997.
Like Tivoli Gardens and Matthews Lane, Spanish Town has a thriving market district, which affords considerable opportunities for extortion. It is the fight for turf which is feeding the present wave of criminal violence in that urban centre. All indicators suggest that the political leadership is seriously compromised and therefore incapable of playing a positive role in the fight against crime.
WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?
The fight against crime requires that the highest priority must be placed on cutting those ties which now bind politicians and criminals. Wherever complicity is found, the full force of the law must be brought to bear. The surest way of convincing criminals that politicians can no longer protect them is by demonstrating that no politician is above the law.
Every law-abiding Jamaican would have been heartened by the public stance taken by the chief of staff of the Jamaica Defence Force, the commissioner of police and his senior staff after the curfew on Tivoli Gardens. It is now clear that we have a new and different kind of leadership in crime fighting and one determined to enforce the law without fear or favour. They must be given the material and moral support to get the job done.
