Dan Rather
GIVEN WHAT is at stake, are we as a nation giving enough attention to President Bush's proposed nuclear deal with India? The deal, which is currently under consideration by Congress, would essentially create an exception to the United States' and international nuclear non-proliferation structure: It would allow the U.S. to share civilian-use nuclear technology with India, in exchange for India opening its non-military nuclear sites to international inspections.
It is a deal that, in its parameters, its intentions and its possible ramifications, seems to touch on just about all of the biggest issues in foreign policy today. Nuclear proliferation first and foremost, but also the global energy crunch, the balance of power in Asia and the global war on terrorism. Any deal that stands to impact so many sensitive areas deserves close examination.
Until now, the United States has denied India nuclear technology because India has not signed the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. Proponents of the new deal say that it simply recognises the reality that India is a nuclear state, and will have the beneficial effect of bringing parts of India's nuclear affairs into the light of international scrutiny. Detractors wonder why, with the U.S. seeking to keep the international community united against Iran's acquisition of certain nuclear technology, President Bush would choose the current moment to help India circumvent the non-proliferation treaty.
Why? Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice supplied one reason in testimony last week before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee because "energy is - I will use the word 'warping' international diplomacy," she said. The rapidly growing economies of China and India (among others) are putting strain on worldwide oil, gas and coal supplies, driving up prices for everybody and enriching some of the states most hostile to the U.S. So facilitating India's use of nonfossil nuclear energy while presumably also giving U.S. industry a chance to benefit might seem like a win-win proposition, if one can put nuclear concerns aside.
But energy isn't the only thing behind the deal. The Bush administration has been not-so-secretly courting India as a potential counterweight to China, the superpower on the make with the world's largest foreign currency reserves, biggest appetite for energy and a growing military. This latest deal would be a part of the developing strategic partnership that U.S. foreign-policy architects seek to build with India.
Is this wise or dangerous, given China's vast holdings of U.S. debt and its leverage in nuclear talks with Iran and North Korea? To ask is not to suggest your reporter knows the answer. Perhaps it is, again, just a question of acknowledging the strategic reality that already exists: In some places, American interests coincide with those of China, and, in other places, we are rivals.
WAR ON TERRORISM, GIVEN
Speaking of rivals, there is also the matter of India's archenemy Pakistan, which also has nuclear weapons. Pakistan also happens to be one of the most important U.S. allies in the war on terrorism, given its geographical proximity to Taliban and al-Qaida strongholds in its border regions abutting Afghanistan. When President Bush arrived in Pakistan last month after making his deal in India, he had to explain -- with Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf at his side -- why Pakistan would not be getting the same deal.
This willingness to embarrass Musharraf may be a sign that the fight against al-Qaida is being eclipsed by broader strategic concerns, such as balance-of-power politics and an effort to curtail the huge revenues reaped by oil states such as Iran. But the stubborn reality of nuclear weapons means that in Pakistan, in India, and anywhere else where they are found, even the best strategic thinking probably ought to be viewed with an abundance of caution.
Dan Rather is an American television broadcaster.
