John Rapley
THE SOUTH Lebanese militia Hezbollah is the centre of attention these days, as the conflict in Lebanon revolves largely around its role in the region. Much is said of the way Syria and Iran use Hezbollah as a proxy army to do their dirty work. But the role played by Hezbollah in mideast politics is more complex than that.
Hezbollah was born in 1982 to resist the then-Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon. At the time, Lebanon was beset by civil war, and what there was of a national army had no capacity whatever to repel the Israelis. With a support base among Shi'ites, Hezbollah also became a convenient way for Iran's young Islamic Republic to gain influence in a region to which it wanted to export its revolution, but in which it faced hostility from Sunni (and Arab) governments.
Funded and trained by the Iranians, Hezbollah also became an ally of convenience to Syria. Although the Syrian regime shares few ideological interests with Iran, Hezbollah became a useful counterweight to its Israeli foe. Since Syria borders Leba-non, and is the principal external power in Lebanese politics, it was able to provide logistical support. It also, apparently, helped arm the militia.
These close links are the reason why many analysts maintain that Iran prompted Hezbollah to provoke this conflict. Under diplomatic pressure to curtail its nuclear programme, Iran allegedly judged a conflict like this would provide it with cover, while pulling off the attack dogs. If that is what is going on here, the strategy, so far, has worked in Tehran's favour.
Nevertheless, while it seems incontestable that Tehran was at least informed, if not involved, in the preparation of this conflict, it is a bit of a leap to conclude that Iran is pulling the strings. Hez-bollah has its own agenda. Sig-nificantly, it also has its own base of support.
Experts on the militia estimate that it receives considerably more of its money from Leba-nese living abroad than it does from Iran or Syria. And in addition to maintaining a small militia, Hezbollah has always provided an extensive network of social services. In the aftermath of the civil war, Hezbollah built houses, schools and clinics throughout the south, and built up an extensive social welfare net. Moreover, its role in prompting the withdrawal of the much-hated Israelis from southern Lebanon in 2000 won it abiding support.
In short, Hezbollah would exist regardless of whether Iran supported it. As for its agenda, with hundreds of its fighters still in Israeli prisons, the militia has its own reasons to capture Israeli soldiers: they are pawns in prisoner-exchange negotiations. Add to this its ideological opposition to Israel - a position still popular in the region, but from which more and more Arab governments have distanced themselves - and Hezbollah enjoys considerable legitimacy on the Arab 'street.'
It is all well and fine to say that the Lebanese Government should disarm Hezbollah and establish its sovereignty over the south of Lebanon. But the Israelis know that won't happen: Hezbollah is simply too powerful, both within and without the Lebanese state. That appears to be why the Israelis have opted for this harsh, unilateral action. They have to know they cannot eliminate Hezbollah. But they may be hoping that they can so degrade its military capacity that they can buy themselves a few years of peace.
That is the way things so often are between Israel and its neighbours. Peace is elusive. The best one can hope for are breathers between periods of fighting. And it is difficult to see what, right now, will change that rule.
John Rapley is a senior lecturer in the Department of Government, UWI, Mona.
