John Rapley

W

hen the British left and the Indian subcontinent broke up in 1947, Pakistan was the poor country cousin to India. Smaller and poorer, it began independence with an empty treasury.

It was almost as if that inauspicious beginning heralded divergent paths. Despite its ups and downs, India has maintained a functioning democracy more or less through its post-independence history. Pakistan quickly descended into long bouts of military rule. If the country's civil society remains vibrant, its political system shows less vigour.

The global fascination with the Indian boom has not passed Pakistan unnoticed. Its economy has also been growing strongly in recent years, albeit at a clip a shade slower than India's. Nonetheless, behind the facade of economic success lies a society which is immersed in a political crisis.

President Pervez Musharraf, who came to power in a military coup and cemented his rule in a dubious election, appears to be losing his grip on power. Public discontent has crystallised around his removal of a judge who was publicly critical of the Government. The case has become a rallying-cry for the opposition, many of whose supporters may have a limited interest in the legality of the matter, and are instead giving vent to their frustration with President Musharraf's rule.

The Government's apparent response to the protests - using thugs to intimidate demonstrators while police stood by and watched - has only worsened the situation. Meantime, while the Pakistani president is commander of the armed forces, and Musharraf is moreover a military man, his hold on the country's security apparatus seems also to be slipping.

Watching anxiously

The Americans, in particular, are watching all this very anxiously. After 9/11, the two governments put aside their differences and Musharraf rallied to the American side in the war on terror. Pakistan abandoned the Taliban regime it had helped install in Kabul, and clamped down on militants in the regions of Pakistan that bordered Afghanistan. In return, the U.S. Government showered its new ally with largesse, providing both military and budgetary aid to prop up Musharraf.

For both sides, it was a risky strategy. The U.S. war on terror did not enjoy broad support in Pakistan. In particular, elements in the country's all-powerful intelligence services continued to maintain links to the Taliban and their Islamist counterparts in Pakistan, the world's second-largest Muslim state. Meanwhile, the border campaigns did not go well. The tribes in the region fought back, and many soldiers lost their lives. Eventually, the military withdrew to its garrisons.

Standing by

Recent reports from U.S. military sources suggest that the Pakistani army may be standing by, or even assisting, as the Taliban and their sympathisers consolidate along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. At the same time, the Bush administration is reluctant to press Musharraf to clamp down on what it sees as wayward elements in the military. With Musharraf under growing domestic pressure, the Bush administration fears that external pressure will make his grip on power ever more shaky.

By throwing their lot in with one another, both Messrs. Bush and Musharraf have engaged in a high-stakes gamble. The White House has taken a soft line on Pakistani nuclear proliferation and the activities of rogue elements in the security services. Mr. Musharraf has thrown his support behind an unpopular U.S. campaign. Their fates are now inextricably bound.

Washington's nightmare scenario would be a military coup by elements with Islamist sympathies. For then, al Qaida would be that much closer to getting its hands on a nuclear weapon. It may not be imminent, but it's probably enough of a worry to - every now and again - wake members of the Washington power elite in the night.