The Editor, Sir:

Beginning in 1992 with the establishment of the commission chaired by the late Mr. Justice Kerr, there have been wide-ranging discussions on constitutional reform. Parliamentarians, members of interested organisations and the general public have all participated.

Out of these prolonged discussions, a virtual national consensus has emerged on a range of changes of fundamental importance that should be made to our existing constitutional structure.

These proposed changes have been embodied in a number of reports by joint select committees of Parliament which have been presented to the House of Representatives and to the Senate.

The proposal for a fixed date for general elections to the House of Representatives, which is currently being mooted, does not form part of this consensus or even, in any significant way, in the discussions that have taken place to date.

As you rightly point out in your editorial of Tuesday, July 10, this idea, at least, deserves the kind of thoughtful deliberation that has been accorded the other important changes to the Constitution.

To begin with, even if we were to accept the general idea of the fixed date, some flexibility would have to be built into the provision to allow for postponement due to a major natural disaster such as a Hurricane Gilbert. Likewise, there ought to be provision to move forward the date in the event of a vote in Parliament of no confidence either in the Government as a whole, or the Prime Minister in particular.

There are other less obvious but morally compelling situations that may demand either postponement or acceleration of a fixed date in the interest of good governance.

Referendum

For example, after the referendum on Federation in 1961, Norman Manley was not obliged to call a general election, and if the fixed-date rule was in existence, he could not have done so.

Obviously, however, in the changed circumstances created by the result of the referendum, it was clearly the correct and the necessary thing to do. The absence of a fixed-date rule does not always work in favour of the incumbent Prime Minister.

Finally, we need to consider very seriously th approach of identifying what experience, common sense and the conventions of the 'Westminster Model' indicate as possible egregious abuses of the discretionary power and prohibit those, while leaving intact the general principle of prime ministerial discretion.

I am, etc.,

David Coore, O.J., Q.C.

Ministry of Justice