Anthony Johnson, Contributor

In Jamaica's 45 years of Independence, there have been few new institutions of more significance than the Jamaican electoral system (JES).

The JES is not only made up of the laws, regulations and offices, but also the convention hammered out in 1979 between the country's two political leaders, and honoured by their successors to this day. The fundamental principle of this convention was founded on the concept that all important electoral decisions will be settled outside of, but with the consent of, the traditional three constitutional powers - executive, judicial and legislative.

It is an indigenous system designed to address the particularities of our country and its political conditions, and has been acclaimed worldwide as having met its purpose of allowing critical electoral decisions to be settled without rancour.

In order to understand the extent to which the JES has developed, one must understand its origins. Jamaica's colonial inheritance had given the executive exclusive power over electoral matters. In its earliest stages, the governor, as chief executive, appointed the director of elections. After Cabinet government (full internal self-government) was implemented in 1959, the power to make this appointment was granted to the minister responsible for electoral matters. For a long time, therefore, a major challenge to the system has been how to get the formal institutions of the state to accept as binding, decisions on issues of paramount importance from a relatively junior body.

The tipping point occurred in 1979 when the Electoral Advisory Committee (EAC) was established to give form to the idea set out in a letter jointly signed by then Prime Minister Michael Manley and then Opposition Leader, Edward Seaga. Over the 28 years since then, the EAC experienced many hiccups and changes of personnel, but one central theme remained - the tacit and fundamental agreement that the people's representatives in government would be bound by the decisions taken by the EAC. This fundamental agreement has been the cornerstone and supporting framework of the JES.

The EAC has now become a commission with wide powers enshrining and expanding upon the powers and objectives devised by the EAC. It would, therefore, be counterintuitive for the powers of the committee to be formally expanded in its new form as a commission, while removing thevery foundation of the committee's effectiveness - that is, the executive's acceptance without question of its proposals.

The JES has removed from contention almost all of the previous issues which created hostility among opposing candidates. The agenda has now shifted to the creation of a system which will ensure 'one man, one vote; same man, same vote' and fully protect the secrecy of the ballot and the security of the voter. If it is to continue to succeed in its objective of eliminating abuse of power in electoral matters, the system must continue to have as much independence from the executive as possible.

ABUSES

Perhaps only persons who have been on the political hustings can fully understand the extent of the powers of the director of elections, and the overwhelming effect that the exercise of these powers in the interest of his political boss, the minister with responsibility for electoral affairs, had in those early days. Some of the powers were:

1. The right to appoint or remove returning officers, presiding officers and poll clerks who may have acted improperly;

2. The right to appoint or remove returning officers, presiding officers and poll clerks who may have acted properly, but against the wishes of the director;

3. The right to change constituency boundaries (which often shift the majorities in favour of one political party or another);

4. The right to deploy special security officers on election day;

5. The right to publish supplementary electoral lists. (One notorious example was in 1976 when supplementary electoral lists were issued by the director the day before elections. Many candidates and several of the affected voters never saw those lists before election day.

6. The right to determine the location of polling stations

The system was used and abused, and the shouts of candidates who lost seats because of abuse were drowned out by a public which felt that all politicians were crooks who protested only because they themselves were not able to get away with abuses. The irony is that it was, in fact, the abuse and perceived abuse of electoral powers which drove some politicians to use the unconventional means which saw Jamaican politics becoming ever more violent.

MAYHEM

After the 1976 General Election, the political temperature had risen, and the Jamaican murder rate took off. As the economy declined and the migration rate increased, it appeared that we were headed for a total breakdown of civil order. Neither side would back down on any issue and 'strength on the ground' was seen as the only solution to the country's political future.

It was not only citizens who fled Jamaica. This era was the first in which there was widespread flight of currency. The J$ had been fixed at a value of US$1.20 or £2 in 1969 and had held until 1971, but by 1976, the black market was demanding J$2 for each US dollar. As the rate declined, inflation took off. Shortages of food and all imports led to supermarket riots.

All problems were blamed on politics. All solutions were deemed to be political and, therefore, corruptible.

As the general election due in 1981 approached, relations across the floor of Parliament deteriorated; there was even a problem recruiting election workers - only die hard political supporters would volunteer. Something had to be done.

THE OPTIONS

There were three types of electoral options presented as open to Jamaica:

1. The Costa Rican model - In this model, electoral affairs are placed under a special commission with the powers of a high court. Once an election is announced, the armed forces are also under orders of this commission. No politician can be a member of the commission and its decisions are final. It was this model which brought Costa Rica from the brink of anarchy in the 1940s to an enviable level of growth and prosperity.

2. The Indian model - This model involves a civilian board with an all-powerful manager who has dictatorial powers to hire, fire, detain, shut downand clean up whatever he deemed to be necessary.

3. Keep the British model and hope for the best.

THE JAMAICAN MODEL

Instead of trying any of the above, it was decided to develop our own model, based on the simple concept of TRUST. It did not seem practical, given our history, but the concept required politicians of both parties to forget the past and recognise that if we continued as before, senseless political violence would continue and worsen.

The following were proposed to ensure the development of a JES, an Electoral Advisory Committee (EAC) was proposed:

1. A committee of seven, comprising three independent citizens of solid reputation and four political representatives, two from each party, would be appointed;

2. The chairman of the committee would be acceptable to both sides;

3. There would be no taking of votes. Decisions would be reached by consensus;

4. Any allegation brought by any side would be properly investigated by the full membership and consensus reached;

5. If a deadlock occurred, the three independent members would meet privately and reach a decision. The political representatives would accept that decision;

6. The legislature would accept, without dissent, any recommendations made by the committee. The minister with responsibility for electoral matters would not issue directives to counter EAC policies, and further, candidates would not challenge the EAC in court.

The EAC sounded like something from an English country club, but it worked.

The first chairman, Professor Gladstone Mills, was a master conciliator and totally incorruptible. The first political representatives were persons whose loyalty was accepted as being absolute to their parties. The certainty of perspectives, positions and the convention of acceptance by the executive was effective.

TOUGH DECISIONS

The EAC has taken some tough decisions. It has abolished constituencies, created new ones, removed polling divisions, removed electoral officials, refused to remove unpopular officials who were felt to be fearlessly honest, and heard hundreds of accusations against presiding officers.

It has stepped on toes of Prime Ministers and Leaders of the Opposition and everyone at other levels of the system. In all cases, however, objective assessment showed that it was acting in good faith. The political representatives on the EAC have been like lambs at a slaughterhouse within their party circles. Nevertheless, both sides have agreed that whatever might be the problems of implementing an EAC consensus, they were far better than th where the sitting government exercised sole power.

It is important, therefore, that we maintain the powerful and tested basis of the JES, namely that all critical and sensitive electoral decisions are made within the Electoral Commission after giving the contending parties full and unfettered opportunity to make their proposals or objections. These issues are not settled in public.

Senator Anthony Johnson, the Senate Minority Leader, was a member of the EAC 1990-1994.