Jamaica Constabulary Force graduates participate in a passing-out parade at the Police Academy at Twickenham Park in Spanish Town, St. Catherine, in February. Research suggests that the transformation of the JCF would significantly improve the police force. - Junior Dowie/Staff PhotographerToday we return to the matter of crime in Jamaica. Given the severity of the problem we, like all concerned Jamaicans, are eager to find solutions that actually work and we are unwilling to accept the defeatist notion that murders and shootings are here to stay as an unmovable part of the landscape.
Both the People's National Party (PNP) and the Jamaica Labour Party (JLP) have tried to present us with a degree of hope - new policies and measures for consideration in the fight against crime. What then becomes a critical question for us is the likely outcome or impact of these proposed measures.
In both manifestos, we see a great reliance on the police to prevent and control crime. Our own research would lead us to agree that a significantly transformed force would indeed be an effective tool in the fight against crime.
Unfortunately, the manifestos only propose the beginnings of such a transformation and not the complete overhaul that would be necessary to effect real change and impact the high rate of violent crimes.
For the benefit of both parties and the Jamaican public, we will now identify the four critical areas of transformation needed in the force.
These are:
1) Police density - In 2001, the density of the police force was 1:355 persons, the lowest in the English-speaking Caribbean at the time
2) The application of technology to policing - Significant movements have been made in this department over the last three years. The new technologies acquired included Automated Palm and Fingerprint Identification System, Integrated Ballistic Identification System, Automated Border Management and Information System.
3) Style of policing - The suggestion is for the Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF) to be transformed into a more civil, general purpose, national police service. This is consistent with the corporate strategy of the JCF, which speaks of making community policing its central thrust. This new-look police service could retain a paramilitary unit including tactical units which would have special responsibility for dealing with particularly violent situations and groups characteristic of the Jamaican situation.
4) Good leadership/accountability - The expected changes would include improved service accessibility and quality, and greater and more direct accountability to the people. Organisational reconfiguration - towards more local decision making -would facilitate the changes in relations with the people and the internal power shifts that are key to ensuring improved internal security and public safety.
Transformational leadership speaks to the leadership model change seen as necessary in the JCF.
Transformational leadership hinges on vision - developing a vision; selling a vision; finding a way forward; and leading the charge.
Unfortunately, while all four are critical areas, only one has been traditionally addressed.
The admittedly clearly-expressed goals with regard to police modernisation in the manifestos have been largely confined to efforts at technological modernisation.
This, we believe, is an extremely limiting form of transformation and it is no surprise that results have been similarly limiting. We further believe that they will continue to be so - as unlikely to 'fly' as a caterpillar that has stayed in its cocoon for too short a period.
Staying the Course
The PNP manifesto presently asks us to stay the course. They have ground to stand on in asking us to do this: there has been a much talked about reduction in crime in the present year so far and the ruling party can claim this as the beginning of dividends being paid off on their policies over the past five years.
As noted in yesterday's article, the PNP was not at all lacking in political will in the implementation of policies from their 2002 manifesto, and should be commended on delivering on their promises.
At CaPRI we are, however, a little more cautious with the preliminary results of this year; as Shakespeare might famously warn - 'the ides of March have come, but have not yet gone.'
The reduction in murder so far is also not a particularly dramatic one, and so while the rate might have dropped the country itself has not fallen from being one of the top five most violent nations in the world. With only a partially transformed force, we believe that some results might well accrue, but we are fearful that they will always be lukewarm.
If the PNP were to form the next government, CaPRI would strongly encourage the party to add to their vision in the manifesto and undertake an even more trans-formative programme for the police force: police density is currently far too low; a change in the style of policing is long, long overdue - one which would allow citizens to be respectful of the police and the police to treat citizens in a likewise respectful manner.
We suggest that this transformation in particular is one that requires more than simply 'training' to accomplish, but a much deeper and fundamental change in the police force.
Finally, a transformation in leadership is necessary - a willingness to change a culture whose roots are in an older, more authoritarian, more autocratic, less service-oriented time. While this has been recently sought from the United Kingdom, the impact on the force in general (on its methods of work for example) has been limited. This is perhaps a failure of strategy and of administration.
The Garrison Problem
The JLP's manifesto does suggest a broader understanding of the crime problem and so, while they largely agree with the PNP about the kinds of changes needed in the police force, they have also suggested other solutions that go beyond a mere reliance on the force.
Significantly in this regard, the very difficult issue of the crime-politics nexus and garrison politics is confronted - through the disqualification of those with criminal records involving gun-related or violent crime from the NCC and enacting the relevant provisions of the Code of Political Conduct into law among others.
By generating violence and disorder, and corrupting the state institutions, both present the society with difficult internal security problems.
This, we believe, is a major step in the right direction as confronting this begins to tackle the increasingly strong institution of organised crime which, as we outlined yesterday, is almost certainly the biggest factor in the rise of murder and violent crime in Jamaica.
It should also be noted that both parties continue to propose social crime prevention programmes. These take time to show results.
Socio-economic interventions like citizens' security and justice programme are also sound. A similar criticism can be levied at attempts by both to use community police officers; community based policing is likely to work, but method suggested which is to recruit individuals and train them is likely to render the programme ineffective. Emphasis is placed on training - training is not the critical success factor for such a measure.
We need to keep up with the technological trends in criminal and other investigation. We need good leadership and accountability in the police force. We need a new style of policing - one in which ordinary citizens are treated with respect.
| Main Items | JLP (3500 additional officers) | PNP (4000 additional officers) |
| Training and recruiting of new officers | 37,000,000 | 43,000,000 |
| Construction and maintenance of police stations | 409,950,000 | 409,950,000 |
| Salaries for entry-level officers | 2,142,000,000 | 244,800,000 |
| Equipping police force in the first budget year: | 6,000,000,000 | 6,000,000,000 |
| Total Cost | 8,555,150,000 | 8,861,150,000 |
1. This is the annual figure for the construction and maintenance of police stations. An additional comprehensive maintenance and construction programme could cost twice as much.
2. This is based on an average monthly gross salary of $51,000 for an entry-level officer.
3. This was the cost of equipping the police force in the first new budget year announced by Derrick Smith, JLP Spokesman on National Security, in Montego Bay at a G2K meeting on February 1, 2007. Both parties have this goal.
References: Economic and Social Survey Jamaica (2006) and Estimates of Expenditure (2006).
Correction: The table published on August 13, 2007 on the estimated cost of the increases in the police force included a mistake. The average monthly salary of an entry-level police officer was mistakenly entered as an annual salary. CaPRI regrets this mistake and has included the corrected figures in the table published today.
