David Jessop, Trade Writer

Tucked away towards the end of the Caribbean Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) with Europe is a section that deals with what are known as the institutional arrangements.

This seemingly dry text is in fact of considerable importance not least because it will determine how the EPA is implemented, who will benefit, and how decisions will be made on its governance.

According to some in the region, it also touches on issues of Caribbean sovereignty and may affect less directly the Caribbean relationship in the all-ACP Cotonou Convention with Europe.

Four new bodies

The Caribbean EPA creates four new bodies: a ministerial level Joint Cariforum-EC Council that will deal with policy and related decisions; an implementing Cariforum-EC Trade and Development Committee at the level of officials; a joint Cariforum-EC Parliamentary Committee for political debate; and a Cariforum-EC Consultative Committee that aims to involve the private sector and other social partners.

The joint Cariforum Council is intended to supervise politically the implementation of the agreement. It will involve representatives of Caribbean and EU states (ministers or ambassadors) plus the European Commission, meeting at least once every two years. It is intended that the council will oversee the operation and implementation of the EPA and take all necessary decisions. In effect it will be the EPA's supreme governing body able to examine any major issue, conflict or any other bilateral, multilateral or international development that might affect the EPA's delivery. The text makes clear that the council will report periodically to the ACP/EU council of ministers and is not intended to supplant its all ACP decision making roles.

Power for new body

The text states, for some controversially, that the new body will have the power to make decisions in respect of all matters covered by the agreement. In language that raises questions in the minds of EPA critics about its compatibility with the CARICOM Treaty, the chapter on institutional arrangement notes that the joint council's decisions will "be binding on the parties and the signatory Cariforum states, which shall take all the measures necessary to implement them in accordance with each party's and signatory Cariforum state's internal rules".

In response to such criticism, the Caribbean Regional Negotiating Machinery argues that this provision is no different to many other agreements that the region has signed. They note that similar arrangements apply within the ACP where a council of ministers has the power to take decisions which are binding on the parties. Similar arrangements they observe exist also in the CARICOM-Costa Rica Free Trade Agreement and the CARICOM Free Trade Agreement and that such language is necessary to ensure the EPA is not static but able to respond to the evolving developmental goals of Cariforum states throughout the life of the agreement thereby avoiding perpetual negotiations.

The institutional arrangements beyond this are much less contentious, but probably far more central to whether the EPA will be able to function to the benefit of the region or not.

At one step down from the council there will be a joint trade and development committee. This is described as assisting the joint council in the performance of its duties and consisting of senior officials. In practical terms this is the EPA's administrative body that will on request look at issues that relate to the EPA's management and its objectives.

Here the text is much more specific. The committee will in the area of trade supervise and implement the provisions of the agreement and recommend priorities. It will also provide any further elaboration of the agreement that might be required; and monitor and discuss almost every other trade aspect of the EPA.

When it comes to development, this body will monitor the implementation of the EPA's cooperation provisions, work with third party donors and review cooperation issues.

The joint trade and development committee will also be able to establish special committees, will meet generally once a year and will hold specific working sessions to perform its functions.

Servicing this body and the new and detailed interrelationships with government and the private sector that will be required would seem to demand the wholesale restructuring of parts of CARICOM into a trade-oriented Cariforum delivery mechanism. So much so that the structure and function of the joint trade and development committee would seem to be far more important and challenging than present arguments about sovereignty.

Beyond this and in order to try to make this process subject to democratic control, the EPA envisages the creation of a Cariforum-EC parliamentary committee in which members of the European parliament and the Cariforum legislatures can meet and exchange views.

It will have the right to ask the other bodies questions and make recommendations to the joint council and joint trade and development committee.

Finally at an institutional level, the EPA envisages a Cariforum-EC consultative committee which is intended, somewhat nebulously, to assist the council promote dialogue and cooperation between representatives of organisations of civil society, including the academic community, and social and economic partners. It membership will be at the invitation of the council.

david.jessop@caribbean-council.org