Russia's invasion of Georgia on the weekend may have been timed to use the cover of the Olympics, while the world's eyes were on Beijing. Nonetheless, the Russian government sought to make a bold statement to the world.
When Russia overthrew its Tsar, nearly a century ago, it did not change the fundamental fact that Russia remained a multinational empire. With over 100 peoples living together, over the country's vast expanse, its government solidified its hold over the land through policies of Russification. Russians were sent to settle occupied lands. Moreover, upward mobility, for all ethnic groups, lay in assimilating Russian language and culture.
The apparent steely grip of communism on the Soviet Union obscured the fact that, by the time it collapsed in the late 20th century, Russians were barely a majority in their empire. Ethnic and national conflict was latent. When Russia declared its independence from the Soviet Union, it effectively renounced its claims on the territories it had governed.
Yet, centuries of Russian rule had left large Russian communities in many of the new states that cropped up in the wake of the Soviet Union's collapse. Moreover, the upsurge of nationalism left many of these communities feeling vulnerable. All the while, as Russia was crippled by economic and political woes, its former rivals in the West aggressively expanded their influence into former Soviet lands. In particular, NATO (the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) eagerly enlisted new members, who had once been squarely in the Russian camp.
To many Russians, these were humiliations. When Vladimir Putin came to power a decade ago, he was determined to reassert Russia's authority. Happily for him, his assent coincided with the beginning of a long period of rising commodity prices. Just when the West needed to placate oil-suppliers, Russia was rich. It had muscles, and Mr Putin was prepared to flex them.
All the while, in newly-independent lands such as Georgia, Russia was a concern. A behemoth, its history of imperialism left them feeling threatened. The Russian communities left behind by retreating Soviet tanks felt vulnerable, and often resisted the new governments. Sometimes, peaceful coexistence resulted. Other times, Russian enclaves constituted themselves as de facto sovereign states, their loyalties to Moscow stronger than their local ones. In the case of South Ossetia, an ethnic group holding Russian passports, they declared their independence from Georgia and looked to Russia to back them up.
Some governments, including Georgia's, decided that the best way to preserve their independence was to align firmly with the West. Georgia's president, Mikheil Saakashvili, was a darling of Washington and an eager Westerniser. Determined to move his country into the NATO orbit, he committed a sizeable contingent of his country's small army to the Iraqi campaign. In return, the US were training and re-equipping the Georgian military.
Government control
Mr Saakashvili had never made a secret of his wish to one day bring all of Georgia under his government's control. After years of stand-offs with South Ossetia, he decided to move on the enclave. Apparently, he judged that his warm relationship with the US would provide him cover to advance on the enclaves.
In the event, Russia responded forcefully. While Georgia's Western friends decried the Russian action, they also revealed there was little they could or would do about it. In effect, Russia has stated that affairs in her "near abroad" are her concerns, not theirs. Russia has leverage, and used it effectively.
Russia may have paid a heavy diplomatic price for its strong reaction but the message is clear. Russia has indicated its interests in the region and will tolerate nobody messing with them.
John Rapley is president of Caribbean Research Institute (CaPRI) an independent think-tank affiliated to the UWI, Mona; for feedback, columns@gleanerjm.com.
